Midfirst Legal Counsel Conspires with Foreclosure Defense and Title Deed Scammers in Court

Midfirst Counsel Shelley Hopkins and Robert Foster of BDF Play Along as Pasquale and Vilt Team Up and Present Case Fraudulently as Campos.
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LIT UPDATE

FEB 12, 2024

LIT UPDATE

JAN 25, 2023

LIT COMMENTARY

DEC 24, 2023

SCREENSHOT DEC. 24, 2023 - MONTH'S AFTER "SETTLEMENT WITH CAMPOS"

It is without doubt, the evidence is overwhelming that for whatever reason, which we believe to be driven by money, rogue lawyer Robert Clayton Vilt is being protected by the legal profession and the Texas judiciary, both at state and federal court levels. LIT’s resolve is unwavering to end this corruption with a jail term for all the parties involved.

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL BY US DISTRICT JUDGE LEE ROSENTHAL

ORDER OF DISMISSAL entered based on the parties stipulation.

This case is dismissed with prejudice.

Case terminated on 8/25/23.

(Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) Parties notified.(leddins, 4) (Entered: 08/25/2023)

STIPULATION of Dismissal Joint Stipulation of Dismissal by MidFirst Bank, filed.

(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)

(Hopkins, Shelley)

(Entered: 08/24/2023)

Campos v. MidFirst Bank

(4:23-cv-01493)

District Court, S.D. Texas, Judge Lee “It’s me against you” Rosenthal

APR 21, 2022 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: SEP 8, 2022

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant MidFirst Bank (“Defendant” or “MidFirst”) files this Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the Court dismiss the claims asserted in Plaintiff Gabriela Campos’ (“Plaintiff” or “Campos”) Original Petition, Application for Injunctive Relief, and Request for Disclosures [Doc. 1-4] (the “Complaint”). In support thereof respectfully shows the Court the following:

I.      NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDING

1.                  On March 29, 2023, Campos sued MidFirst in order to stop the April 4, 2023 scheduled foreclosure of the property located at 12135 Braesridge Drive, Houston, Texas, 77071 (“Property”) despite being in default in paying in accordance with the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust (the “Loan Agreement”) secured by that Property. [Doc. 1-4]. Plaintiff obtained an ex- parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to prevent the sale of the Property based alleging claims for: (1) declaratory judgment; (2) breach of contract; (3) violations of the Texas Prop. Code. § 51.002; and (3) unreasonable collection efforts. Id.

2.                  On April 21, 2023, Defendant MidFirst removed the case to this Court. [Doc. 1].

At this time, no scheduling order has been entered.

II.      STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW

3.                  Defendant files this Motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

All of Plaintiff’s claims fail legally as a matter of law. Specifically:

a.       Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment action, based upon alleged violations of the Note or Deed of Trust is nothing more than an attempted wrongful foreclosure claim, as no cause of action exists for “attempted” wrongful foreclosure, this claim fails as a matter of law;

b.      Plaintiff cannot maintain an action for breach when she was in breach of her payment obligations under the loan agreement. Further, Defendant did not breach the contract as the evidence illustrates compliance with all terms of the Note and Deed of Trust;

c.       There is no private right of action under the Texas Property Code for violation of its provisions, however, subject thereto, Defendant’s evidence establishes compliance with the Texas Property Code;

d.      Plaintiff’s claim for unreasonable collection fails due to the economic loss doctrine and her lack of damages;

e.       Plaintiff has no viable cause of action, so she is therefore not entitled to injunctive relief.

4.                  Rule 56 Summary Judgment Standard of Review. Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the movant succeeds, the non-movant must come forward with evidence “such that a reasonable party could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “A factual dispute is deemed ‘genuine’ if a reasonable juror could return a verdict for the nonmovant, and a fact is considered ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing substantive law.” Cross v. Cummins Engine Co., 993 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court will view the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non- movant. Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). After the non-movant has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the non- movant, summary judgment will be granted.” Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000).

III.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5.                  On December 7, 2018, non-party Edward Campos (Plaintiff’s spouse) executed a Note (the “Note”) in the amount of $218,960.00 to obtain a loan on the Property, commonly known as 12135 Braesridge Drive, Houston, Texas 77071. The Note requires Plaintiff to make monthly principal and interest payments on the first day of each month beginning on February 1, 2019, and continuing each month until paid in full. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Note, Plaintiff and Edward Campos executed a Deed of Trust (the “Deed of Trust”), which granted a security interest in the Property to secure repayment of the Note.1 The Deed of Trust provides that Plaintiff (and Edward Campos) shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any late charges due under the Note. The Note and Security Instrument are collectively referred to herein as the “Loan” or the “Loan Agreement.” MidFirst is the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust pursuant to assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. recorded in the official public records of Harris County, Texas.2

6.                  Plaintiff and Edward Campos defaulted on the payment obligations under the Loan by failing to submit monthly payments as agreed. The Loan is due for the August 1, 2022 payment, and all payments that have become due after that date.3 As a result of the default under the Loan, on November 23, 2022, MidFirst sent Edward Campos and Plaintiff a Notice of Default. The Notice of Default informed Plaintiff and Edward Campos of the amount of the delinquency as well as gave them over thirty days to cure the default before the Loan would be accelerated.4 The Notice of Default was sent via first class mail as well as via certified mail to the Property. Id.

1 See Exhibit A and A-2.

2 See Exhibit A and A-3.

3 See Exhibit A.

4 See, Exhibits A and A-4.

7.                  Plaintiff and Edward Campos failed to cure the default within the time period provided within the Notice of Default. As a result, on January 24, 2023, Plaintiff and Edward Campos were sent a Notice of Acceleration informing the parties that the maturity of the debt had been accelerated.5 The Notice of Acceleration was sent to Plaintiff and Edward Campos at the Property via first class and certified mail. Id. Included with the Notice of Acceleration was a Notice of Sale informing Plaintiff that the Property was scheduled to be sold at foreclosure sale on May 3, 2022. Id. However, the foreclosure sale did not occur as scheduled as a result of Plaintiff obtaining an ex-parte restraining order in state court.

8.                  Though Plaintiff applied for loss mitigation, she never supplied a fully completed mortgage assistance application. MidFirst attempted to provide Plaintiff with a thorough review of her mortgage assistance options, but was unable to do so when Plaintiff failed to cooperate and supply the necessary documentation.6 Having provided Plaintiff an opportunity for assistance and met with an uncooperative borrower, MidFirst had no choice but to proceed with foreclosure.

IV.    SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

9.                  Defendant attaches hereto and incorporates by reference the following exhibits in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment:

Exhibit A Declaration of MidFirst (“Ex. A”) is incorporated herein by reference, and authenticates the following exhibits referenced therein:

Exhibit A-1: Note;

Exhibit A-2: Deed of Trust; Exhibit A-3: Assignment;

Exhibit A-4: March 26, 2021 Letter;

5 See, Exhibits A and A-5.

6 See, Exhibits A, A-4, A-5, A-6 and A-7.

Exhibit A-5: April 8, 2021 Letter;

Exhibit A-6: June 16, 2021 Letter; Exhibit A-7: Notices of Default;

Exhibit A-8: Notice of Acceleration and Notice of Substitute Trustee’s Sale;

Exhibit A-9: March 15, 2023 Letter;

Exhibit A-10:March 28, 2023 Letter.

V.      ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A.                Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief.

10.              Plaintiff asserts a claim for declaratory judgment seeking determination that “the pending foreclosure sale of her real property is wrongful” based upon (1) the Defendant’s alleged failure to follow the notice requirements of the Loan Agreement and Texas Property Code and (2) the alleged failure to comply with HUD regulations in the Deed of Trust. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 15 [Doc.1-4]. In order to obtain declaratory relief, there must be an existing, actual controversy between the parties and must be such that it can presently be litigated and decided and not hypothetical, conjectural, conditional or based upon the possibility of a factual situation that may never develop. Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1989); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434 (1975). Both of Plaintiff’s arguments underlying her request that that foreclosure sale be determined wrongful, rely upon that sale being completed. Plaintiff’s claims are moot and no controversy exists because Plaintiff’s TRO prevented the foreclosure.

(i)                 No Cause of Action Exists for Attempted Wrongful Foreclosure.

11.              While Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, this claim is in reality an attempt at pre- emptively asserting a claim for wrongful foreclosure. It is undisputed that the foreclosure has not taken place and no cause of action exists for attempted wrongful foreclosure. Foster v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 848 F.3d 403, 406-407 (5th Cir. 2017); EverBank, N.A. v. Seedergy Ventures, Inc.,499 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

12.              In Texas, a claim for wrongful foreclosure requires a plaintiff to show: (1) a defect in the foreclosure proceedings; (2) a grossly inadequate selling price; and (3) a causal connection between the defect and grossly inadequate selling price. Foster at 406. A completed foreclosure sale is pre-requisite to this claim as a wrongful foreclosure claim cannot survive if the party asserting the claim never lost the property in question. Id. citing Motten v. Chase Home Fin., 831

F. Supp. 2d 988, 1007 (S.D. Tex. 2011); see also Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 734 F.3d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 2013). There is simply no cause of action in Texas for “attempted” wrongful foreclosure. As such, and as there has not been a foreclosure sale, Plaintiff’s complaints about MidFirst’s alleged failure to follow pre-foreclosure procedures (notices and HUD regulations) do not support any entitled to declaratory relief.

(ii)               All Notices Served in Accordance with the Law.

13.              Even if she could maintain her claim for declaratory relief, Defendant followed all procedures required under the loan agreement and all applicable law. First, in compliance with the Deed of Trust and the Texas Property Code, Defendant sent Plaintiff notice of default on November 23, 2022.7 When Plaintiff failed to tender payment to cure, notice of acceleration and notice of sale were sent to Plaintiff on March 15,2023.8

14.              Pursuant to the Texas Property Code, service of a notice(s) under § 51.002 is complete when the notice is deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the debtor at the debtor’s last known address. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(e). When MidFirst caused

7 See Exhibits A and A-4.

8 See Exhibits A and A-5.

the notice of default, notice of acceleration and notice of substitute trustee’s sale to be served on Plaintiff, MidFirst complied with the Note, Deed of Trust and the Texas Property Code.9

15.                Plaintiff also argues that she did not “receive” notice of default, notice of acceleration and notice of substitute trustee’s sale. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 10. [Doc. 1-4]. However “receipt” is not the standard under the law. Pursuant to Texas Property Code §51.002(e), service of the notice of default under Tex. Prop. Code. 51.002 is complete when the notice is deposited in the United States mail. Delivery of the notice is not required, thus proper notice was given to Plaintiff when notice of default was deposited into the mail. Service of a notice under Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002 by certified mail is complete when the notice is deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the debtor at the debtor’s last known address. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(e). When MidFirst sent notice of default and intent to accelerate and, at its direction, caused the notice of acceleration and notice of substitute trustee’s sale to be served on Plaintiff, they were in compliance with all the Note, Deed of Trust and the Texas Property Code.

(iii)             MidFirst Complied with HUD Regulations.

16.              As part of her declaratory relief claim, Plaintiff seeks judgment that the previously scheduled foreclosure was wrongful for MidFirst’s alleged failure to follow regulations of the Department and Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). In her Complaint, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to provide a “face-to-face” counseling session pursuant to the Deed of Trust and HUD regulations, allegedly incorporated into Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust under §15. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 11 [Doc. 1-4]. However, section 15 of Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust does not relate to HUD regulations and/or face-to-face meeting requirements. Plaintiff cannot illustrate that any regulation of HUD is incorporated into the Deed of Trust. In addition and as previously stated, these

9 See Exhibits A, A-4 and A-5.

allegations are moot because the foreclosure did not take place and do not amount to an actual live controversy for declaratory relief.

B.                 Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach Fails.

17.              Plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of contract against MidFirst, also based upon MidFirst’s alleged failure to send notices and failure to conduct a HUD required face to face meeting. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 19 [Doc. 1-4]. Under Texas Law, to prevail on her breach of contract claim Plaintiff must plead and prove that: (1) Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to a valid and enforceable contract; (2) Plaintiff performed, tendered performance, or was excused from performing under the contract; (3) Defendant breached the contract; and (4) Defendant’s breach caused Plaintiff injury. Hovorka v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 262 S.W.3d 503, 508-09 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2008, no pet.); Doss v. Homecoming Financial Network, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 706, 713 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).

18.              It is not disputed that the loan on the subject property is in default under the Loan Agreement and therefore Plaintiff lacks the ability to establish an essential element of her breach of contract claim. See Metcalf v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 3:11-cv-3014, 2012 WL 2399369 *10 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2012); Owens v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. H-11-2552, 2012 WL 912721 *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2012); Lewis v. Bank of Am., N.A., 434 F.3d 540, 544-45 (5th Cir. 2003). Texas law is clear that where, as here, a plaintiff is in default on a contract due to his own failure to perform, that plaintiff may not assert a claim for breach of a contract. See Juarez v. Wells Fargo, No. 5:17-cv-00756-FB-RBF, 2018 WL 835211 at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 1895549 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2018). (“Having failed to perform his obligations pursuant to the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to see how Juarez could ever prevail on a breach of contract claim of the type he describes.”) (citing Vera v. Bank of Am., N.A., 569 F.App’x. 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2014)); Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 1:17-CV-1162-RP, 2018 WL 3544797, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 3, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 3543497 (W.D. Tex. July 23, 2018) (dismissing breach of contract claim because “Plaintiff affirmatively states that he has breached the loan agreement rather than pleading that he has performed under the agreement.”). Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails because she is in default and cannot establish that she was excused from performance under the Loan Agreement.

19.              Even if Plaintiff was somehow able to establish that the notice of default and notice of acceleration were defective (they were not), that new notices were required at any time, or that MidFirst breached any term of the loan agreement, Plaintiff has not suffered damages. Plaintiff has still not made payments on the Loan Agreement and remains in possession of the Property. Plaintiff does not dispute that foreclosure has not taken place (the TRO prevented the foreclosure), and therefore any damages are “speculative” and do not satisfy the damage element required for a breach of contract claim. Where foreclosure has not occurred, Plaintiff’s damages are at most a threat of damages as opposed to actual damages that would satisfy the damages element of a breach of claim contract. See De La Mora v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 7:17-cv-468, 2015 WL 12803712, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015) (“Plaintiff cannot show damages resulting from any such breach because no foreclosure sale has occurred.”). When a party alleges that the breach of a mortgage contract would result in an improper foreclosure, he or she cannot recover damages if no foreclosure has taken place. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Robinson, 391 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

20.              When the defendant complied with the terms of the contract (as is the case herein) and the plaintiff cannot demonstrate any damages, a breach-of-contract claim cannot stand.

Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 13 F. Supp. 3d 636, 646 (N.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d, 783 F.3d 1022 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Wright v. Christian & Smith, 950 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.)). No foreclosure has occurred and Plaintiff cannot establish damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to allege a plausible breach of contract claim in this case.

C.                No Cause of Action Exists for Violation of the Texas Property Code.

21.              Plaintiff also attempts to assert an individual claim for violation of Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code.10 Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that MidFirst did not send proper notice of default, opportunity to cure the default, notice of intent to accelerate the debt, notice of acceleration and notice of foreclosure. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶¶ 20-22 [Doc. 1-2]. Plaintiff’s claim has no basis in law or fact and fails as a matter of law because allegations based upon defects in notice of foreclosure sale under Tex. Prop. Code §51.002 do not give rise to an independent action for declaratory relief under the Texas Property Code. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d) does not provide a private right of action. Rucker v. Bank of Am., N.A., 806 F.3d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 2015).11 Therefore, this claim fails as a matter of law.

10 See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶¶ 20-22 [Doc. 1-2].

11 Though the Texas Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue, a majority of the federal Courts to consider the issue have concluded that § 51.002 of the Texas Property Code provides no private cause of action. The federal courts of Texas have all spoken to this issue within the last two years and have all found no cause of action under §51.002. Representative cases include the following (1) Western District of Texas – see Bixler v. MidFirst Bank, No. 22-cv- 00090, 2022 WL 19076394 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2022); Penta v. Cenlar Capital Corp., No. 1:19-CV- 0915-DAE, 2020 WL 7695831, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2020); (2) Northern District of Texas – see Vinson v. AmeriHome Mtg. Co., 4:22-cv-0928-P, 2023 WL28955252 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2023) citing Mitchell v. PHH Mort. Co., 4:21-cv-1258, 2022 WL 6950351, (N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2022)(“there is no independent cause of action for breach of §51.002”); (3) Eastern District of Texas – see Robinson v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00016, 2022 WL 17823974 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2022); Kovalchuk v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, 528 F. Supp. 3d 647, (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2021); and finally, (4) Southern District of Texas – Fairweather v. Amegy Bank, H-19-2799, 2021 WL 665904 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021)(following majority of other District Courts in finding no independent cause under §51.002 and granting Amegy summary judgment); see also Rucker, 806 F.3d at 831 (recognizing that District Courts that have considered the issue have “conclude[d] that Section 51.002(d) does not intend an independent private cause of action.”).

D.                Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Unreasonable Collection Efforts.

22.              Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that MidFirst failed to allow Plaintiff to reinstate or cure the default, intentionally misleading Plaintiff, placing improper charges on the account and by using deceptive means to collect the debt, constituting unreasonable collection efforts by MidFirst. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 25 [Doc. 1-4]. This claim fails as Plaintiff has (1) not plead any bodily injury and (2) Texas law does not allow mental anguish claims in mortgagor/mortgagee matters because the relationship between the two is not what is referred to as a “special relationship.” Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp., 74 S.W.3d 444, 453 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.)(no mental anguish between mortgagor and mortgagee because the relationship is not a “special relationship” under Texas law).

23.              Under Texas law, unreasonable collection is a common law intentional tort.” EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Jones, 252 S.W.3d 857, 868 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); see Garcia v. Nueces Cty. Emps. Credit Union, No. 13-08-00209-CV, 2008 WL 4938271, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.). A claim of unreasonable collection efforts under Texas law requires a showing of “a course of harassment that was willful, wanton, malicious, and intended to inflict mental anguish and bodily harm.” Massey v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 546 F. App’x 477, 483 (5th Cir. 2013); Water Dynamics, Ltd. v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass’n, 2013 WL 363118, 2 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Jones, 252 S.W.3d 857, 868 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2008); Narvaez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 757 F.Supp.2d 621, 635 (N.D. Tex. 2010); Thomas v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 499 F. App’x 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2012); EMC Mortg. Corp. at 868. A more specific description of this tort includes “efforts that amount to a course of harassment that was willful, wanton, malicious, and intended to inflict mental anguish and bodily harm.” EMC, 252 S.W.3d at 868; Connell v. Rosales, 419 S.W. 2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1967, no writ); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Brewer, 416 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex. App.—Waco 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e).

24.              Plaintiff simply has not shown, and cannot show that MidFirst’s collection efforts amounted to a course of harassment that was willful, wanton, malicious, and intended to inflict mental anguish and bodily harm. Therefore, this claim fails as a matter of law.

E.                 Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Injunctive Relief.

25.              Finally, Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief precluding Defendant from foreclosing on the Property. A request for injunctive relief, however, is not a cause of action itself, but is dependent on an underlying cause of action. See Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 3796413, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2014); Barcenas v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. H-12- 2466, 2013 WL 286250, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2013) (holding claim for injunctive relief failed because plaintiff did not adequately plead any of their substantive legal claims); Cheaton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. H-11-1777, 2012 WL 298533, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2012) (dismissing petition requesting injunctive relief without other viable cause of action). Because Plaintiff has not asserted any viable causes of action against Defendant, Plaintiff is not entitled to any injunctive relief and such request should be denied.

VI.    CONCLUSION

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Defendant MidFirst Bank respectfully requests that its Motion to Dismiss be granted and Plaintiff Gabriela Campos’s claims be dismissed with prejudice. Defendant MidFirst Bank further requests all relief, at law or in equity, to which it is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

By:      /s/ Shelley L. Hopkins

Shelley L. Hopkins – Attorney In Charge
State Bar No. 24036497
SD ID No. 926469
HOPKINS LAW, PLLC
3 Lakeway Centre Ct., Suite 110
Austin, Texas 78734
(512) 600-4320

BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, LLP – Of Counsel ShelleyH@bdfgroup.com shelley@hopkinslawtexas.com

Robert D. Forster, II
State Bar No. 24048470
SD ID No. 2647781
BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, LLP
4004 Belt Line Road, Ste. 100
Addison, Texas 75001
(972) 386-5040
RobertFO@bdfgroup.com

Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of June 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, and will send a true and correct copy to the following:

 

Robert C. Vilt
VILT LAW, P.C.
5177 Richmond Avenue, Suite 1142
Houston, Texas 77056
clay@viltlaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiff
/s/ Shelley L. Hopkins

Shelley L. Hopkins

“…a lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:23-cv-01493

Campos v. MidFirst Bank
Assigned to: Judge Lee H Rosenthal

Case in other court: 234th Judicial District Court of Harris County, 23-20187

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 04/21/2023
Date Terminated: 08/25/2023
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Plaintiff
Gabriela Camposrepresented byRobert Clayton Vilt
Vilt Law, P.C.
5177 Richmond Avenue
Suite 1142
Houston, TX 77056
713-840-7570
Fax: 713-877-1827
Email: clay@viltlaw.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMichael Edward Bertolatus
Vilt Law, P.C.
5177 Richmond Avenue
Suite 1142
Houston, TX 77056
713-840-7570
Fax: 713-877-1827
Email: michael@viltlaw.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Defendant
MidFirst Bankrepresented byRobert Davis Forster , II
Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel
4004 Belt Line Road
Suite 100
Addison, TX 75001
972-386-5040
Fax: 972-341-0734
Email: robertfo@bdfgroup.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDShelley L. Hopkins
Hopkins Law, PLLC
3 Lakeway Centre Ct.
Suite 110
Austin, TX 78734
512-600-4320
Email: shelley@hopkinslawtexas.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

 

Date Filed#Docket Text
04/21/20231NOTICE OF REMOVAL from 234th Judicial District Court of Harris County, case number 2023-20187 (Filing fee $ 402 receipt number ATXSDC-29792547) filed by MidFirst Bank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 04/21/2023)
04/21/20232CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by MidFirst Bank, filed.(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 04/21/2023)
04/28/20233ANSWER to 1 State Court Petition/Notice of Removal by MidFirst Bank, filed.(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 04/28/2023)
05/09/20234ORDER Scheduling Rule 16 Conference With the Court and Setting Out the Requirements for Initial Pretrial Work. Initial Conference set for 6/14/2023 at 03:30 PM by video before Judge Lee H Rosenthal. A Zoom link will be provided. (Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) (Attachments: # 1 Supplement) Parties notified.(leddins, 4) (Entered: 05/09/2023)
05/09/20235ORDER on Initial Discovery Protocols for Residential Mortgage Cases.(Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) Parties notified.(leddins, 4) (Entered: 05/09/2023)
05/19/20236CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES by Gabriela Campos, filed.(Vilt, Robert) (Entered: 05/19/2023)
05/19/20237DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESS LIST by Gabriela Campos, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Resume of Robert C Vilt)(Vilt, Robert) (Entered: 05/19/2023)
05/31/20238JOINT DISCOVERY/CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by MidFirst Bank, filed.(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 05/31/2023)
06/12/20239MOTION for Summary Judgment by MidFirst Bank, filed. Motion Docket Date 7/3/2023. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 06/12/2023)
06/14/202310Minute entry for proceedings before the Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal. Initial conference held on June 14, 2023, by Zoom. The court will hear argument on the defendants motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2023, at 10:00 a.m., by Zoom, if this matter does not settle before that time. Appearances: Clay Vilt for Pltf. and Shelley Hopkins for Deft.(Court Reporter: G. Dye), filed.(leddins, 4) (Entered: 06/15/2023)
06/23/202311NOTICE of Resetting. Parties notified. Motion Hearing reset for 6/29/2023 at 03:15 PM by video before Judge Lee H Rosenthal, filed. NOTE: The change is to TIME only. A Zoom link will be provided. (leddins, 4) (Entered: 06/23/2023)
06/23/202312AMENDED COMPLAINT against MidFirst Bank filed by Gabriela Campos. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Vilt, Robert) (Entered: 06/23/2023)
06/28/202313NOTICE of Resetting. Parties notified. Motion Hearing reset for 6/29/2023 at 11:00 AM by video before Judge Lee H Rosenthal, filed. NOTE: The change is to TIME only. (leddins, 4) (Entered: 06/28/2023)
06/29/202314NOTICE of Resetting. Parties notified. Motion Hearing reset for 7/7/2023 at 10:30 AM by video before Judge Lee H Rosenthal, filed. A Zoom link will be provided. (leddins, 4) (Entered: 06/29/2023)
07/05/202315Supplemental EXHIBITS re: 12 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc. by Gabriela Campos, filed.(Vilt, Robert) (Entered: 07/05/2023)
07/07/202316ANSWER to 12 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc. by MidFirst Bank, filed.(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 07/07/2023)
07/07/202317Minute entry for proceedings before the Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal. Hearing held on July 7, 2023, by Zoom. The court sets a status conference for August 31, 2023, at 10:00 a.m., by Zoom. Appearances: Clayt Vilt for Pltf. and Shelley Hopkins for Deft.(Court Reporter: L. Wells), filed.(leddins, 4) (Entered: 07/10/2023)
08/24/202318STIPULATION of Dismissal Joint Stipulation of Dismissal by MidFirst Bank, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 08/24/2023)
08/25/202319ORDER OF DISMISSAL entered based on the parties stipulation. This case is dismissed with prejudice. Case terminated on 8/25/23. (Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) Parties notified.(leddins, 4) (Entered: 08/25/2023)

 


 

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09/08/2023 11:45:01

ANSWER to 12 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc. by MidFirst Bank, filed.(Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 07/07/2023)

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